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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are several centers based at leading law
schools committed to the study of criminal law and
procedure, the institutional administration of criminal
justice, and legal ethics. They share the mission of
promoting best practices in the operation of
prosecutors’ offices and the criminal justice system
more broadly through academic research, litigation,
and participation in the formulation of public policy.
Many of amici’s directors and faculty advisors amassed
significant experience as federal and state prosecutors
before entering academia, while others served as
defense attorneys or with private organizations
involved in criminal cases. Several are now academic
leaders in the scholarship and teaching of criminal law
and procedure and legal ethics.
Petitioners contend that liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 cannot arise from the failure to train
prosecutors because they are already sufficiently
equipped to avoid constitutional violations by law
school and passage of a bar exam, and are effectively
policed by professional disciplinary authorities. Amici
– who know firsthand the inevitably superficial level
of understanding of the doctrine first enunciated in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that is
transmitted in law school – strongly disagree that
1

The parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief and
their consent letters have been filed with the Court. No counsel for
a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No persons other than
amici, their members or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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these are adequate safeguards. They are concerned
that acceptance of Petitioners’ position could result in
prosecutors cutting Brady-related training at a time
when, ironically, wide consensus has developed as to
its necessity. Accordingly, amici submit this brief in
support of Respondents in order to promote ongoing
and effective training of prosecutors as an invaluable
mechanism for ensuring both effective law
enforcement and the protection of constitutional
rights.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has held “that evidence of a single
violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing
that a municipality has failed to train its employees to
handle recurring situations presenting an obvious
potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal
liability” under § 1983. Bd. of County Comm’rs. of
Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); see
also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
Petitioners argue that an office of prosecutors
cannot be held liable under this theory unless there is
a pattern of previous violations because prosecutors
are already armed against error and wrongdoing by
virtue of having graduated from law school, passed a
bar exam, and taken up positions as licensed
professionals. In light of these attributes, Petitioners
assert, no one could foresee that prosecutors would be
likely to violate constitutional rights, and without such
predictability there can be no finding of deliberate
indifference or liability under § 1983.
In fact, it is entirely predictable that Brady
violations will occur if prosecutors are not given

3
effective training. The recurrence of mistakes and
deliberate violations by prosecutors when they handle
Brady material, documented repeatedly across
decades, confirms that prosecutors need training.
Complying with Brady often presents complex legal
problems that can easily lead to error, and making the
right decision is even harder in light of the
institutional pressures prosecutors face to win their
cases. Neither courses in criminal law and professional
responsibility nor study for the bar exam imparts
sufficient knowledge about Brady’s doctrinal
complexities or ethical demands. Nor is the prospect of
discipline from state bar authorities a serious
deterrent in light of how rarely prosecutorial
misconduct is investigated, much less sanctioned.
Petitioners and their amici are therefore wrong to
claim that chief prosecutors can reasonably rely on
their subordinates’ status as professionals to prevent
constitutional violations. See Points I and II, infra.
Petitioners’ view that training is unnecessary and
cannot prevent Brady violations is equally misguided.
There is wide acceptance of the essential need to
conduct ongoing education of prosecutors in the law
and ethics of subjects like Brady compliance, and the
Department of Justice and most state offices now
employ such training. Petitioners’ argument
contradicts this long-term trend and, if accepted,
threatens to set government back in adopting the very
practices needed to prevent more tragedies like the one
that befell Thompson. See Point III, infra.
Justice Jackson, then Attorney General, famously
observed that the prosecutor “has more control over
life, liberty and reputation than any other person in
America.” Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor,

4
24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940). In light of
this tremendous power, it is wrong to simply assume
that a law degree and a license and nothing more
properly equip prosecutors to make the right decisions.
Continuing, effective training is imperative to protect
constitutional rights.
ARGUMENT
I. Brady Violations Are Predictable in the
Absence of Ongoing, Effective Training
A. Prosecutors Have Consistently Struggled
with Brady’s Requirements
The clearest indication that there is an obvious
need to train prosecutors in the law and ethics of
Brady compliance is the substantial accumulated
evidence that prosecutors fail at the task at a
consistent and significant rate. Many violations are
never uncovered, making it impossible to get more
than a glimpse of the true scope of the problem. But
enough instances of unlawful suppression have
surfaced over the years to cast doubt on Petitioner’s
claim that any lawyer with a diploma and a passing
grade on the bar exam is ready to fulfill a prosecutor’s
constitutional disclosure obligations.
Several studies of particular groups of cases have
found recurring Brady violations. One review of all
capital convictions in the United States from 19731995 found that illegal suppression of evidence
accounted for 16% of all state post-conviction reversals
– the second most common cause. See James S.
Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan
Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
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1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000). The
Chicago Tribune reviewed records of cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct throughout the country and
found 381 homicide cases, 67 of them capital, in which
convictions were reversed because the government
concealed exculpatory evidence or used evidence
known to be false. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice
Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1999, at A1, available at www.chicagotribune
.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1,0,479347.story.
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reviewed 1,500 allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct in the preceding ten years
and “found hundreds of examples of discovery
violations in which prosecutors intentionally concealed
evidence that might have helped prove a defendant
innocent or a witness against him suspect.” Bill
Moushey, Win at all Costs, Hiding the Facts, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998 at A1.
The New York State Bar Association’s Task Force
on Wrongful Convictions closely examined 53 cases of
reversed convictions in that state and determined that
violation of Brady was one of the factors potentially
responsible for the erroneous results. See N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 19
(2009), www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Blogs1&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conten
tID=27188 (hereafter “N.Y. REPORT”). The task force
also cited thirteen other published New York decisions
featuring Brady violations. See id. at 26. In North
Carolina, the easing of post-trial access to prosecutors’
files in 1996 led to the reversal of ten death sentences
for Brady violations. See Robert Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics and the Road to the Disbarment of

6
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File
Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 261 (2008).
There have also been several individual, highly
publicized cases of Brady violations in recent years.
Perhaps most notable was the Department of Justice’s
admission that Brady violations so tainted the trial of
Senator Ted Stevens that post-conviction dismissal
was required. See Mike Scarcella, Sen. Stevens Trial
Suspended Over Possible Brady Violation, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008 at 1. The government’s prosecution
of W.R. Grace executives for asbestos poisoning in
Libby, Montana was derailed by Brady violations,
leading the judge to harshly criticize prosecutors. See
Kirk Johnson, Judge Says Asbestos Case Can Proceed,
N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2009 at A17. The prosecution of
Duke University lacrosse players for sexual assault
collapsed upon the revelation that the prosecutor
withheld exculpatory DNA test results. See Shaila
Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Jailed: Students Seek
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007 at A8. Widely
reported convictions of two executives in New York for
antitrust violations were later overturned due to the
state Attorney General’s failure to produce potentially
exculpatory documents. See Noeleen G. Walder,
Former Executives’ Convictions Upset Over AG’s
Failure to Turn Over Documents to Defense, N.Y. L.J.,
July 9, 2010 at 1. A federal case against two men
accused of forming a “terrorist sleeper cell” in Detroit
was dismissed because the government withheld
favorable evidence. See John Farmer, Prosecutors Gone
Wild, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2009, at A29.
Last year, the Chief Judge of the District of
Massachusetts noted the government’s “long pattern
of inadvertent failures to produce material exculpatory

7
information, and cases of intentional misconduct as
well” in that district, observed that violations there
continued despite repeated admonitions by the courts,
and considered sanctioning the United States
Attorney. United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163,
168-85 (D. Mass. 2009). The court cited a 2007 report
by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules noting
the “significant number of cases in which the courts
have found Brady violations, as well as many more
cases in which the courts have found that exculpatory
material was not disclosed” though no due process
violation resulted. Id. at 172. The court also appended
a non-exhaustive list of 68 reported federal cases
featuring Brady violations and failures to disclose
exculpatory or impeachment evidence. See id. at 18593, Ex. A.
Overall, one former prosecutor and leading scholar
of prosecutorial ethics concludes that “[t]housands of
decisions by federal and state courts have reviewed
instances of serious Brady violations, and hundreds of
convictions have been reversed because of the
prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence.”
Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v.
Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006); accord
Andrew Smith, Note, Brady Obligations, Criminal
Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1938 (2008) (“disclosure violations
continue to occur at high rates at both the federal and
state levels”).
While recent high profile cases of Brady error and
misconduct like the Stevens trial post-date
Thompson’s prosecution, there is no reason to believe
that Brady violations are more numerous now than
they were in 1985. If anything, the additional quarter
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century of judicial guidance about Brady’s
requirements should have facilitated compliance.
Many of the cases analyzed in the studies discussed
above took place around the time of Thompson’s
prosecution, and commentary from that period notes
the many cases featuring Brady error that had already
come to light. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697-98 (1987) (noting
“disturbingly large number of published opinions”
documenting intentional Brady misconduct and
additional cases where prosecutors inadvertently
failed to disclose); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.
Redelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 56 (1987) (identifying 35
cases of suppression of exculpatory evidence that led to
wrongful convictions in capital cases).
Of course, whether now or in 1985, it is impossible
to know the true scope of government error in applying
Brady. As Justice White recognized in Imbler v.
Pachtman, “unlike constitutional violations committed
in the courtroom . . . the judicial process has no way to
prevent or correct the constitutional violation of
suppressing evidence. The judicial process will by
definition be ignorant of the violation when it occurs;
and it is reasonable to suspect that most such
violations never surface.” 424 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1976)
(White, J., concurring). “Once a trial is over most
defendants no longer have counsel actively seeking
exculpatory evidence, and most witnesses are
effectively unavailable to the defense.” Rosen, supra,
at 702. For their part, prosecutors are either unaware
of the nondisclosure if it stemmed from legal error, or

9
motivated to perpetuate if it stemmed from willful
concealment.2
The persistent frequency of disclosure violations
undermines Petitioners’ argument that no district
attorney would suppose his subordinates were in
danger of wrongfully suppressing evidence. Amici
strongly believe that the vast majority of prosecutors
are ethical public servants committed to ensuring a
fair trial, but the consistent occurrence of Bradyrelated error suggests Petitioners are wrong about the
predictability of violations and calls for
acknowledgment of the legal and ethical challenges
that give rise to the problem.
B. Brady Confronts Prosecutors
Complex Legal Questions

with

Applying Brady is not a simple or mechanistic task.
This Court has repeatedly observed that there will
inevitably be close calls. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, __ U.S.
__, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) (noting “doubtful
2

Since most Brady violations likely remain hidden from view,
Petitioners’ claim that Connick’s office handled “thousands of
cases” while “only” four convictions of innocent people emerged is
specious. Pet. Br. 46-48. Moreover, many of these thousands of
cases would not have presented the opportunity to commit
disclosure error since they ended in guilty pleas or were so minor
that significant quantities of evidence about the crime,
exculpatory or otherwise, would not have fallen into prosecutors’
hands. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (no
duty to disclose exculpatory impeachment evidence prior to entry
of plea). In any case, the long-term record of Petitioners’ office
may be open to question, as Respondents point out. See Resp. Br.
13-14; Armstrong & Possley, supra (noting Connick’s office was
“condemned repeatedly for withholding evidence”).
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[Brady] questions”); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439
(1995) (“judgment calls” inherent in Brady decisions);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)
(prosecutors have to “deal[] with an inevitably
imprecise standard”). Petitioners acknowledge this and
even go as far as to admit, disturbingly, that some
prosecutors may well be going about their work with “a
defective understanding of Brady.” Pet. Br. 38-39, 5253; see also Br. of Amicus District Attorneys Ass’n of
the State of N.Y. 15 (Brady decisions “different in
every case, complex, and at times difficult”).
Perhaps the most vexing aspect of the Brady
analysis is its materiality component. If the evidence
in question is not material, disclosure is not required,
even though it might be useful to the defense. See, e.g.,
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108-13. Materiality, in turn, hinges
on whether nondisclosure will result in deprivation of
a fair trial considering all the proof adduced at trial.
See id. at 112-13. This standard requires a prosecutor
to determine before trial whether the trial would be
deemed fair afterward, when the record is complete
and the verdict rendered, if the evidence is not
disclosed. See id.; accord, United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
Forcing prosecutors to estimate the fairness and
outcome of the trial before it actually occurs poses
quandaries, starting with the government’s lack of
information about how the trial will develop at the
time materiality must be considered. One district court
summarized the difficulty:
Most prosecutors are neither neutral (nor
should they be) nor prescient, and any such
[materiality] judgment necessarily is
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speculative on so many matters that simply are
unknown and unknowable before trial begins:
which government witnesses will be available
for trial, how they will testify and be evaluated
by the jury, which objections to testimony and
evidence the trial judge will sustain and which
he will overrule, what the nature of the defense
will be, what witnesses and evidence will
support that defense, what instructions the
Court ultimately will give, what questions the
jury may pose during deliberations (and how
they may be answered), and whether the jury
finds guilt on all counts or only on some (and
which ones).
United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C.
2005). In addition, prosecutors with no prior
experience representing criminal defendants may
simply fail to see how seasoned defense counsel would
utilize certain evidence, and therefore fail to view it as
material.
A second challenge is that, since the materiality
standard requires weighing a single piece of
potentially exculpatory evidence against all
inculpating evidence, the totality of which may seem
especially powerful in the investigative stage,
prosecutors may wrongly conclude that “the guiltier a
defendant seems before trial, the less disclosure he is
legally owed.” Christopher Deal, Note, Brady
Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to
Disclose and the Right to Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1780, 1784 (2007). Because prosecutors naturally
believe in the guilt of those they charge and labor to
convict, the materiality analysis can encourage underdisclosure. The prosecutor must “achieve a state of
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cognitive separation where she can simultaneously
recognize that a piece (or pieces) of evidence objectively
can create a reasonable doubt for the jury while still
believing the case warrants prosecution.” Scott E.
Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional
Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 662 (2002).
Making this recognition can be further complicated
by cognitive biases, well documented in social science
research, which can creep into prosecutorial
determinations no less than any other sort of decisionmaking. Confirmation bias, which leads one to recall
and emphasize information confirming his existing
hypothesis and discount contradictory data, may result
in prosecutors undervaluing potentially exculpatory
evidence. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving
Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 159496, 1609-12 (2006). Selective information processing,
which causes one to home in on information consistent
with prior beliefs and filter out seemingly inconsistent
facts, can cause prosecutors to take inculpatory
evidence at face value while overly questioning the
utility of potentially exculpatory evidence to the
defense. See id. at 1596-99, 1611-12. These basic
cognitive biases can contribute to a form of tunnel
vision that makes guilt appear stronger than it
otherwise might and thereby skew judgments about
materiality. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 351-52 (2006).
Aside from navigating materiality, applying Brady
raises myriad other complex issues requiring
prosecutors’ informed and experienced legal judgment.
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Because “in many cases, the scope of the relevant law
is contested or its application is unclear,” and
approaches “vary among the federal district courts,”
the legal terrain is often hazardous. Bruce A. Green,
Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn From
Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161,
2164, 2179 (forthcoming 2010), available at
www.cardozolawreview.com/content/31-6/green.316.pdf. Such issues include:
• whether inadmissible evidence can be material,
see, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d
1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1008 (1990); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) at 5
(discussing distinction between admissible
evidence and “favorable information” and
applicable disclosure duties);
• whether the prosecutor’s view of the veracity of
the evidence matters, see, e.g., United States v.
Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1082 (1997);
• whether Brady applies to all impeachment
evidence, compare Conley v. United States, 415
F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005) (impeachment
evidence immaterial if “cumulative or
impeaches on a collateral issue”), with United
States v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 480-81 (7th Cir.
2007) (“evidence that provides a new basis for
impeachment is not cumulative and could well
be material”);
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• whether implicit and unwritten understandings
with government witnesses are subject to
disclosure, see, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223,
233 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
114 (2008);
• the degree of disclosure required prior to a
guilty plea, compare United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (no duty to disclose
exculpatory impeachment evidence prior to
plea), with McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d
782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (production of
evidence establishing innocence may be
required prior to plea);
• the proper timing of disclosure, compare United
States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.
2001) (must only be in time for “effective use” of
evidence), with Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89,
101 (2d Cir. 2001) (disclosure “on the eve of
trial, or when trial is under way” may be tardy);
• whether Brady applies to unrecorded
information, see United States v. Rodriguez, 496
F.3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2007);
• whether third parties who produced information
to the government that might exculpate
defendants can object to and prevent disclosure,
see United States v. Williams Cos., 562 F.3d
387, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mike Scarcella, Arms
Company Fights to Keep DOJ Docs Secret, NAT’L
L. J., June 28, 2010, at 17, 20; and
• whether Brady applies to files reflecting current
leads and ongoing investigations, compare

15
Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir.
2000) (no disclosure of information reflecting
leads and investigations required absent
existence of exculpatory information), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 999 (2001), with Bowen v.
Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 612 (10th Cir.)
(exculpatory material should have been
produced in part because it could have been
“used to uncover other leads and defense
theories and to discredit the police
investigation”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962
(1986).
Brady’s tendency to confound prosecutors is
illustrated by this case. The jury heard ample evidence
that several prosecutors were involved in the nonproduction of evidence exculpating Thompson, and
that they were confused about what Brady demanded
of them. See Resp. Br. 17-20, 56-60. Petitioners strive
to relitigate the strength and meaning of that evidence
in this Court and argue that trial tactics like “skillful
cross-examination” duped the jury into its verdict. Pet.
Br. 57. But it seems far more plausible that, as
Respondents showed at trial, some or all of the four
prosecutors involved simply misanalyzed the relevant
Brady questions than that all four joined in an illegal
conspiracy to deliberately violate Thompson’s
constitutional rights.
C. Prosecutors Face Institutional Pressures
That Compound the Difficulty Inherent in
Correctly Applying Brady
The analytical difficulties prosecutors face when
deciding what evidence to produce are magnified by a
host of institutional pressures. One of these is simply
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the nature of the adversary system, which places
paramount emphasis on winning. Writing in 1957,
Judge Jerome Frank noted the “peculiar dilemma” of
the “reflective, conscientious prosecutor” assigned the
task of safeguarding the defendant’s rights while
simultaneously fulfilling “another duty, that of
convicting a criminal.” Jerome Frank & Barbara
Frank, NOT GUILTY, 233 (1957). Given this unique
duality not faced by defense lawyers obligated to focus
exclusively on zealously representing their accused
clients, prosecutors could “scarcely [be] blame[d]” for
falling back on standard adversarial “wiles and
stratagems.” Id.
In the same vein, Richard Uviller, an assistant
district attorney and later a Columbia Law School
Professor who admitted regarding his fellow
prosecutors as “the flower of the bar,” cautioned:
Young assistants think of themselves primarily
as advocates. The case they make, or (more
likely) inherit from a law enforcement unit, is
cast immediately as a trial scenario. It is refined
and amplified – as it usually requires – in
preparation for exposure to a jury. In this
posture, of course the Assistant cares a good
deal more for supplementary information that
fortifies the case against the defendant than
new data that calls his thesis into question. . . .
[E]ven the best of the prosecutors – young,
idealistic, energetic, dedicated to the interests of
justice – are easily caught up in the hunt
mentality of an aggressive office.
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H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The
Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1699-1700, 1702 (2000). As the
former Inspector General of the Justice Department
responsible for investigating allegations of civil rights
violations by prosecutors put it: “there is a tremendous
amount of pressure to be aggressive and to push the
limit.” Symposium, The Changing Role of the Federal
Prosecutor, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 737, 744 (1999)
(remarks of Michael R. Bromwich). Many prosecutors
are young and, as Connick acknowledged was true of
many of his assistants, “fresh out of law school,” JA
442, and are therefore especially vulnerable to such
pressure.
Winning defuses both internal office pressures and
external public and political ones. Internally,
prosecutors are often evaluated based on their wins
and losses. One survey of 103 state prosecutors
revealed that “a number of prosecutors view their
primary function in terms of conviction and
punishment,” and that the “conviction rates of
prosecutors are used as a measurement of success at
prosecutorial work.” George T. Felkenes, The
Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 12122 (1975). Offices have been reported to calculate and
distribute win-loss “batting averages” and post
convictions and acquittals on bulletin boards with
color-coded stickers. See Daniel S. Medwed, The
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH.
L. REV. 35, 44 (2009). One of Thompson’s prosecutors
testified to “pressure on DAs to get convictions” in
Connick’s office. JA 190. While obtaining convictions
should and usually does reflect a properly
administered office that charges defendants
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appropriately and competently handles cases, it can
wrongly become the only thing that matters to some
prosecutors.
Externally, state prosecutors like Connick are
elected and so understandably prefer to win their cases
in order to enhance the odds of continuing in office. A
record of convictions also assists prosecutors’ offices in
their ongoing jockeying with legislatures over budgets.
When a case is highly publicized, as was Thompson’s,
internal and external pressures on the assigned
prosecutors only increase.
*****
For all these reasons – longstanding empirical
evidence that Brady violations are “a persisting
problem” for prosecutors, Pet. Br. 24; the inherent
analytical challenges posed by the doctrine; and the
well-known institutional pressures brought to bear on
prosecutors making disclosure decisions – it is plain to
most prosecutors, and should have been obvious to
Petitioners, that Brady-related training is essential.
See Bd. of County Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 407 (liability
may stem from taking approach defendant should
know will fail to prevent tortious conduct). There was
in 1985 and is today “a glaring need for training
[prosecutors] on constitutional standards” relating to
disclosure, Pet. Br. 27, and no additional pattern of
past violations by Connick’s office was necessary
before Petitioners should have reached that conclusion.
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II. Law School, the Bar Exam and Professional
Discipline Are Insufficient Guarantors of
Defendants’ Constitutional Right to
Disclosure
The primary reason Petitioners and amici claim
prosecutors’ violations of Brady could never be
predicted absent a history of earlier violations is the
fact that, prior to their hiring, prosecutors have made
it through law school, passed a bar exam, and assumed
the status of licensed professionals personally
responsible for “obeying the standards of their own
profession.” Pet. Br. 19, 25; see also Br. of District
Attorneys Ass’n of the State of N.Y. 11. Petitioners
also cite the “ethical regime” of professional discipline
as a reason why it would never have occurred to
Connick to train his subordinates. Pet. Br. 28-29. In
fact, these are porous defenses against the violation of
constitutional rights.
A. Law School and the Bar Exam Do Not
Adequately Equip Prosecutors
Petitioners’ broad faith in law school and the bar
exam to ensure accurate and ethical Brady decisionmaking is at odds with the facts. First, though Connick
believed his assistants “follow[ed] the rules in 99.9
percent of the cases,” he fully appreciated the inherent
limitations of any large staff of prosecutors in a major
jurisdiction like New Orleans:
Connick . . . said his prosecutors labor under
difficult circumstances where mistakes can
happen. Many are inexperienced. Turnover is
rampant. He has 80 prosecutors, and this year,
30 are new. Next year, 30 more will be new. His
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prosecutors average 30 jury trials year – a
daunting caseload – and they can find it
difficult to keep track of what evidence has been
disclosed in every case they handle, Connick
said.
Armstrong & Possley, supra; see also Resp. Br. 15.
Perhaps in recognition of these “difficult
circumstances,” Petitioners claim Connick took various
informal steps intended to help and monitor
subordinates, though they concede none “comfortably
equate[d] to a ‘training program’ under Canton.” Pet.
Br. 42. But if Connick truly believed prosecutors were
adequately prepared by law school and the bar to
handle all aspects of their jobs, he presumably would
not have bothered instituting such procedures. While
it was up the jury to decide whether the informal
practices Petitioners now extol were sufficient to
prevent constitutional violations – a question the jury
fairly resolved against Petitioners – their claimed
existence belies Petitioners’ current litigation position
that, actually, nothing more than a diploma and law
license were needed.
In reality, it is unlikely that the head of an office of
young, overworked lawyers practicing almost any sort
of law would place the kind of absolute trust in law
school and licensing Petitioners claim Connick did
when authorizing subordinates to make the most
crucial decisions of life and liberty. As for law school,
Petitioners point to no evidence in the record
indicating what the prosecutors who handled
Thompson’s case actually learned there about Brady,
the extent and quality of their instruction, and what if
anything they might have retained after graduating.
Courses like criminal law and criminal procedure may
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last no more than one or two semesters and
necessarily cover the waterfront of related subjects.
Criminal procedure is not a required course at many
law schools. Discussion of Brady may consume no
more than a class or two, if that, and it is extremely
unlikely that anything more than the most superficial
understanding of the subject can possibly be imparted.
Amici are on the front lines of legal education and
firmly believe that serious comprehension of Brady’s
legal complexities is not typically achieved in law
school. Pretending that newly minted law graduates
are “extensively educated” on Brady, Pet. Br. 27,
simply ignores reality.
Nor do professional responsibility courses prepare
graduates for the ethical pitfalls that sometimes
accompany tough Brady decisions. Particularly in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the prosecutors who
staffed Petitioners’ office in 1985 were in law school,
professional responsibility courses were not uniformly
mandatory and usually consisted of a single one-hour,
pass-fail course dedicated largely to memorizing the
ABA canons. See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in
Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43, 45 (2009).
Then and now, such classes also concentrate primarily
on private civil practice and may, paradoxically, only
reinforce adversarial tendencies that can be
counterproductive when it comes to meeting the
government’s criminal disclosure obligations. As one
ex-prosecutor commented a few years after
Thompson’s trial: “Law school training in professional
responsibility tends, quite understandably, to focus
upon the private practitioner, whose obligation, in
significant part, is to zealous advocacy on behalf of the
particular client. . . . It is with this indoctrination that
many individuals enter into service as prosecutors.”
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Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an
Adversarial System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 686
(1992).
Placing faith in bar exams puts supervising
prosecutors on even shakier ground. Such exams may
or may not include Brady-related questions, and those
who pass may or may not have managed to study for
that part of the test or gotten such questions right. It
is the rare lawyer who, having frenetically crammed in
the weeks before the test, will retain much of anything
so tenuously absorbed. Rarer still is the lawyer who
would stake any serious outcome once in practice on
what she recalls from studying for the bar exam, or the
law firm that would be so cavalier with potential
malpractice liability.
Chief Justice Burger recognized the fallacy of
Petitioners’ argument long ago when he urged the bar
to “[f]ace up to and reject the notion that every law
graduate and every lawyer is qualified, simply by
virtue of admission to the bar, to be an advocate in
trial courts in matters of serious consequence.” Warren
E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are
Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 227, 240 (1973). He continued:
Our traditional assumption that every lawyer,
like the legendary Renaissance man, is
equipped to deal effectively with every legal
problem probably had some validity in the day
of Jefferson, Hamilton, John Adams and John
Marshall, but that assumption has been diluted
by the vast changes in the complexity of our
social, economic and political structure.
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Id. at 239. The Chief Justice likened the view espoused
by Petitioners to the questionable notion that any
doctor who graduates from medical school and is
licensed by the state is “competent to perform surgery
on the infinite range of ailments that afflict the human
animal.” Id. at 231. No more so is any newly licensed
lawyer automatically prepared to perform any legal
task, however specialized and complex, as Petitioners
assert. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979)
(noting “trend toward specialization” in legal practice).
B. The Possibility of Professional Discipline
is Too Remote to Deter Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The “ethical regime designed to reinforce the
profession’s standards” invoked by Petitioners is
equally ineffective as a tool to protect constitutional
rights. Pet. Br. 28. The fact is, almost no prosecutor
who commits misconduct actually faces the “severe
consequences” Petitioners cite: suspension or
disbarment. Id.
One study found that, while charges were
dismissed, convictions reversed or sentences reduced
in 2,000 cases due to prosecutorial wrongdoing since
1970, only 44 of these resulted in discipline of
prosecutors, and none led to criminal prosecution. See
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 60
(2005). In reviewing 53 cases of wrongful convictions in
New York, the State Bar Association’s Task Force
concluded: “Research has not revealed public
disciplinary steps against prosecutors. . . . There is
little or no risk to the specific official involved
resulting from a failure to follow the rule.” N.Y.
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REPORT at 29. In California, a commission created by
the legislature in 2004 analyzed 54 cases where
misconduct led to the reversal of convictions and
determined that none had resulted in a report to the
state bar, though state law requires California judges
to give such notice. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (2008),
www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf
(hereafter “CAL. REPORT”).
In 1987, law professor Richard Rosen examined
several compilations of ethics decisions and other
published sources and surveyed each state’s bar
counsel in an effort to determine how frequently
prosecutors who violated Brady faced professional
discipline. See Rosen, supra, at 718. He uncovered only
nine instances where discipline was even considered,
and 35 states reported that no complaints had ever
been filed. Id. at 719-31. When contrasted with the
“numerous reported cases” of Brady violations
contained in judicial decisions, Rosen’s scant findings
indicated that “reliance on the Disciplinary Rules as a
deterrent for Brady-type misconduct is misplaced.” Id.
at 731. A later study confirmed that few additional
cases had been brought in the ensuing decade. See
Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The
Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 833, 881-82 (1997); see also Jones, 620 F. Supp.
2d at 177 (“Neither referral to OPR, other disciplinary
bodies, or public criticism has sufficiently deterred
prosecutorial misconduct.”).
Petitioners note that a prosecutor in Connick’s
office who learned of the suppression of the blood
evidence in Thompson’s case in 1994 and did not

25
report it was later sanctioned. See Pet. Br. 28. Such
discipline is exceedingly rare, however, and even this
prosecutor was merely reprimanded. See In re
Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239, 1248-49 (La. 2005). The
Louisiana Supreme Court actually rejected a
disciplinary board’s recommendation of a six-month
suspension. See id. More importantly, the three
prosecutors who bore responsibility for failing to
produce Brady material to Thompson aside from the
junior-most assistant who died in 1994 (Deegan)
received no sanction at all.
Finally, some amici who support Petitioners stress
that “tradition and experience justify” the belief that
most prosecutors will fulfill their duties, and that chief
prosecutors can therefore simply presume that they
will do so. See Br. of Amici Nat’l League of Cities, et al.
9 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
397 (1987)). The same could be said of police officers,
however, most of whom are also surely well
intentioned public servants bound by their
departmental rules as well as federal and state law
proscribing the violation of suspects’ rights.
Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that failure to
train law enforcement agents when the need is obvious
can give rise to liability. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
The question is not whether most prosecutors or police
officers are presumptively good people who mean to
meet their obligations – amici agree that they are –
but whether it is clear that training is vital to enable
them to do so.
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III.

Brady-Related Training Is Essential to
Ensure Proper Disclosure

Petitioners may “strain[] to imagine . . . when it
should ever be ‘obvious’ to a district attorney that he
needs to train prosecutors to know and obey the law,”
Pet. Br. 31 (emphasis in original), but there is actually
wide agreement among prosecutors and experts that
effective and ongoing Brady-related training is a
fundamental component of administering a
prosecutor’s office. In fact, today “most prosecutors’
offices have extensive training programs on Brady.”
Gail Donaghue, Section 1983 Cases Arising from
Criminal Convictions, 18 TOURO L. REV. 725, 731
(2002); accord Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady
and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961, 1989 (Stephanos Bibas, reporter) (forthcoming
2010), available at www.cardozolawreview.com
/content/31-6/group_reports.31-6.pdf (“Prosecutors’
offices in large metropolitan areas typically provide inhouse training on various aspects of criminal practice,
including disclosure and ethical obligations”).
At the federal level, the Stevens case and others
prompted “a thorough review” of the Department of
Justice’s discovery policies and training, leading to the
announcement that federal prosecutors will participate
in annual Brady training to be provided by a discovery
coordinator assigned to each United States Attorney’s
Office and litigating component. See U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE, DEP. ATT'Y GEN. MEM., ISSUANCE OF
GUIDANCE AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN
RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AND CASE MANAGEMENT
WORKING GROUP 3 (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice
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.gov/dag/dag-memo.pdf. Even before the recent spate
of cases featuring Brady error, the United States
Attorney’s Manual “recogniz[ed] that it is sometimes
difficult to assess the materiality of evidence before
trial” and therefore “encourage[d] prosecutors to
undertake periodic training concerning the
government’s disclosure obligation and the emerging
case law surrounding that obligation.” DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, §§ 9.5001(B)(1),
(E) (1997).
The Department of Justice’s confidence in training
to avert legal violations can also be seen in how it
enforces criminal laws binding corporations. The
Department will defer prosecution or recommend
lesser sanction for entities that adopt employee
training programs as part of a compliance regime
designed to deter the commission of future violations,
and penalties under the sentencing guidelines are
lower for companies that create such programs. See id.
§§ 9-28.300, 9-28.800 (2008); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2009). Petitioners’
view that prosecutors need no Brady compliance
training conflicts, ironically, with the position
prosecutors themselves take toward legal compliance
in the private sector.
States and municipalities have also established
disclosure training programs. In New York, nearly a
dozen prosecutors’ offices in larger counties have fulltime training directors who conduct monthly sessions
on prosecutors’ disclosure duties, among other
subjects, including the ethical component of making
decisions on production to the defense. See
Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups,
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supra at 1989 n.32. In addition to training programs in
individual counties, the New York Prosecutor’s
Training Institute “makes sure that assistants in
offices large and small, in every area of the State, have
access to free, quality programs.” Hearings before N.Y.
State Bar Ass’n Task Force on Wrongful Convictions
(Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Richard A. Brown,
Queens County District Attorney), http://www.daasny
.org/DABrownWrongfulTestimony.html. California’s
District Attorneys Association similarly “provide[s]
intensive training to thousands of prosecutors, peace
officers and allied professionals each year” in subjects
including disclosure, see Cal. District Attorneys Ass’n,
Training Dept., www.cdaa.org/training/index.asp (last
visited August 9, 2010), and that state’s Commission
on the Fair Administration of Justice recommended
such training for prosecutors because “compliance with
Brady obligations should not be left up to each
individual deputy’s own interpretation of statutory and
case law.” CAL. REPORT at 87, 90-91. While state offices
undoubtedly train in different ways depending on their
particular needs and caseloads, and amici agree that
one size hardly fits all in this area, offices are
increasingly unlikely to take Petitioners’ extreme view
that training is completely unnecessary.
Professional groups concur. The ABA’s Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice promulgated a
standard in 1971, long before Thompson’s case,
providing: “Training programs should be established
within the prosecutor’s office for new personnel and for
continuing education of his staff.” ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 2.6 (Approved draft
1971); see also ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra, at 8
(supervisory lawyers “must ensure that subordinate
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prosecutors are adequately trained regarding [their]
obligation” to disclose evidence to defendants).
Likewise, the National District Attorneys Association’s
National Prosecution Standards provide: “The
prosecutor and his staff should participate in formal
continuing legal education.” NAT ’ L D ISTRICT
ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS
§ 9.5 (2d ed. 1991).
In 2009, several amici joined the ABA’s Criminal
Justice Section, the National District Attorneys
Association and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers to sponsor a symposium to examine
Brady in operation and develop best practices for
compliance. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1943, 1946 (forthcoming 2010), available at
www.cardozolawreview.com/content/31-6/
yaroshefsky.31-6.pdf. One working group consisting of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and academics
focused on prosecutor training and “agreed on the need
for both formal programs and informal training on
Brady and disclosure.” Symposium, New Perspectives
on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of
the Working Groups, supra at 1989. The group
specifically considered Thompson’s case and “rejected
the notion, advanced by at least one district attorney
[Connick], that district attorneys may rely exclusively
on law school training and prosecutors’ own sense of
ethics as sufficient discovery training.” Id. In addition
to training newly hired prosecutors, the group
concluded that training “should also remain periodic,
perhaps annual or semiannual, throughout a
prosecutor’s career.” Id. at 1991.
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Importantly, training in disclosure consists of more
than simply imparting information about applicable
substantive law; it also entails education in
prosecutorial ethics. Writing almost two decades ago,
Judge Kozinski emphasized the essential nature of
such training in a case where the Ninth Circuit
vacated a conviction following the government’s
suppression of a cooperation agreement with a
witness:
The overwhelming majority of prosecutors are
decent, ethical, honorable lawyers who
understand the awesome power they wield, and
the responsibility that goes with it. But the
temptation is always there: It’s the easiest thing
in the world for people trained in the
adversarial ethic to think a prosecutor’s job is
simply to win.
One of the most important responsibilities of
the United States Attorney and his senior
deputies is ensuring that line attorneys are
aware of the special ethical responsibilities of
prosecutors, and that they resist the temptation
to overreach. Training to impart awareness of
constitutional rights is an essential function of
an office whose administration of justice the
public relies on.
United States v Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir.
1993) (citations, quotations and punctuation omitted).
The 1971 ABA standards also stressed that “[t]raining
within the prosecutor’s office should give special
emphasis to ethics.” ABA STANDARDS, supra, Standard
2.6.
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More recently, exonerations brought about by DNA
testing have increased recognition of the need for
systematic training of the sort described by Judge
Kozinski. For example, Dallas’ District Attorney Craig
Watkins, who established a specific unit to investigate
allegations of wrongful convictions in light of Dallas’s
particularly high number of exonerations, noted that
the unit is also responsible for training newer
assistants “on the ethical side of a prosecutor’s job –
things like the importance of properly dealing with
exculpatory evidence.” Radley Balko, Is This America’s
Best Prosecutor?, REASON, Apr. 7, 2008, http://reason
.com/archives/2008/04/07/is-this-americas-bestprosecut. Prosecutors must be taught “to think about
their jobs in a different way,” Watkins avers; “[w]e
shouldn’t be judging young prosecutors by how many
convictions they win, or by how many people they put
in jail.” Id. Watkins also stresses the importance of
complying with Brady in hiring interviews. See
Yaroshefsky, Foreword, supra, at 1952. The New York
State Bar Association’s task force similarly
recommended that prosecutors receive regular training
“to make sure that the relevant due process principles
are fully internalized and become the starting point for
all cases.” N.Y. REPORT at 37.
Perhaps most importantly, mandatory training
helps foster an office environment necessary to
overcome the pressures that can lead to misconduct. It
is widely accepted that office culture plays a critical
role in determining prosecutors’ behavior. Cf. Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346-47 (2003) (discussing
former culture of Dallas District Attorney’s Office to
encourage racial discrimination in jury selection and
give incoming prosecutors “formal training in
excluding minorities from juries”). “Conscientious
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commitment to an office policy or tradition goes a long
way toward the ideal of quasi-judicial performance” by
prosecutors. Uviller, supra, at 1718. Ongoing training
about and emphasis on the importance of matters like
Brady compliance promotes the proper internal
culture. It sends a message to junior prosecutors and
thereby deters violations – not simply because
assistants have a greater knowledge about Brady law,
but because they sense its clear importance to
supervisors and the office as a whole. The Queens
County District Attorney testified to the New York
task force “that he takes every opportunity to send the
clearest message to his assistants that their
paramount responsibility is ‘to do justice.’ Training is
the most important way of sending the unequivocal
message.” N.Y. REPORT at 37 (emphasis added).
Communicating the importance of protecting
fundamental rights is especially crucial if office policy
is to “turn over what [is] required by state and federal
law, but no more,” as Petitioners describe Connick’s.
Pet. Br. 6-7. In contrast to Connick’s view, this Court
has repeatedly urged prosecutors to “err on the side of
transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure.” Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15 (and
authority cited therein). Ethics rules, like Model Rule
3.8(d) and state analogs, similarly call for broader
disclosure than is strictly mandated under Brady. See
ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra, at 4-5. If office policy
cuts in the opposite direction, as Connick’s apparently
did, training to at least make sure required production
actually occurs is all the more vital.
The consensus that has developed in support of the
need to provide training in Brady’s legal and ethical
mandates undermines Petitioners’ repeated assertions
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that “no amount of training could have prevented” an
intentional Brady violation. Pet. Br. 21; see also id. 3940 56, 61; Br. of Nat’l District Attorneys Ass’n, et al. 6.
Initially, Respondents convincingly demonstrate that
the jury had ample grounds to reject Petitioners’
“single rogue prosecutor” theory. See Resp. Br. 57-63.
More generally, it is shortsighted to see intentional
violations only as the products of the innate character
defects of incurably immoral prosecutors. Violations
also stem from the institutional pressures on
prosecutors discussed in Point I, supra – a point the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, illustrated in a recent
address:
If you give a person the MPRE and ask, “You
find Brady material on a Saturday afternoon.
What do you do? A: turn it over. B: shred it,”
everyone will get the answer (option A) right.
But the answer might not be clear to the person
who is sitting alone in his office on a Saturday
afternoon – particularly if it is an important
case, particularly if it is a heated case,
particularly if it involves defense counsel that
he really does not get along with, particularly if
it is a close case. He might start to doubt
himself and think, “It’s really not Brady
material. I’m not really worried about it. It’s not
that big of a deal.”
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical Culture
of a Prosecutor’s Office, 84 WASH. L. REV. 11, 16-17
(2009). The scenario Fitzgerald describes – surely a
more common one than the prosecutor who sets out to
ruin defendants’ lives by wrongfully imprisoning them
because he is incorrigibly evil – is the basic sort of
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quandary systematic and repeated Brady training
exists to address by helping prosecutors build the
fortitude to make close calls under pressure and by
sending the crucial message that the office values
ethical behavior above burnishing its conviction
record.
If Petitioners are correct that training is powerless
to deter intentional wrongdoing, it is hard to see the
point of the entire field of legal ethics. Stanford Law
Professor Deborah Rhode, a leading expert in
professional responsibility, writes that, while not a
panacea certain to prevent any and all lapses, ethics
instruction can shape conduct:
More than a hundred studies evaluating moral
education courses find that well-designed
curricula can significantly improve capacities of
moral reasoning and that individuals in their
twenties and thirties gain more than younger
students. . . .
If, as most evidence suggests, some
individuals will be helped to some extent in
some contexts when they confront difficult
moral questions, that is a sufficient justification
for ethics coverage.
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42
J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 46-48 (1992); see also Derek Bok,
Can Ethics Be Taught?, CHANGE, Oct. 1976 at 26, 30
(“Although the point is still unproved, it does seem
plausible to suppose that the students in these courses
will become more alert in perceiving ethical issues,
more aware of the reasons underlying moral

35
principles, and more equipped to reason carefully in
applying these principles to concrete cases”).
The widespread adoption of training by prosecutors’
offices diminishes the likelihood of future cases like
Thompson’s based on deliberate indifference arising
from the failure to train. Some amici supporting
Petitioners claim that potential § 1983 liability will
force prosecutors to establish continuing education
programs when they otherwise might have steered
resources elsewhere, see Br. of Amici Nat’l District
Attorneys Ass’n, et al. 12, but the prevalence of such
programs already in place and the wide consensus
supporting their necessity largely obviates these
concerns.
Similarly, Petitioners’ and their amici’s many
warnings that affirming Thompson’s award will lead
to runaway “vicarious liability” for every sort of
mistake are vastly overstated. Pet. Br. 35-36. As
Petitioners note, the standards for failure-to-train
liability that guided the district court in this case were
largely derived from Walker v. City of New York, 974
F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961
(1993). See Pet. Br. 33-34. Yet there has been no flood
of §1983 liability bankrupting prosecutors’ offices in
the districts comprising the Second Circuit in the 18
years since that decision. In fact, research reveals no
reported decision affirming or reporting a finding or
judgment of liability on the part of prosecutors for
failure to train on Brady in the Second Circuit
following Walker – something one would expect if there
was merit to the dire predictions voiced by Petitioners
and supporting amici. Nor is there any indication
there that frivolous claims have notably increased or
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that prosecutors have shrunk from aggressively
pursuing cases when appropriate.
Moreover, other prosecutorial transgressions
mentioned by the dissent below and cited by
Petitioners and their amici as fertile ground for future
lawsuits – wrongful searches and seizures, failure to
give Miranda warnings, or errors relating to experts
and sentencing, see Pet. Br. 35, 53 – are less likely to
generate civil proceedings because, unlike the secret
suppression of exculpatory evidence, they typically
become known to the defendant or his counsel during
the criminal case and can be addressed and remedied
in that proceeding before prejudice results,
diminishing the likelihood of a later civil suit.
Precisely because training is now so widely
understood to be a critical ingredient in any welladministered prosecutor’s office, it would be
unfortunate if the Court’s decision in this case
validates Petitioners’ notion that it is actually
unnecessary. As amici stress, prosecutors’ offices
habitually face budget constraints and understandably
look for areas to cut. See Br. of Amicus Nat’l District
Attorneys Ass’n, et al. 8-9. Indeed, in advertising its
training services to local prosecutors’ offices, the
National College of District Attorneys cited this very
case as a warning against forgoing training and urged
“reexamination of the old attitude that ‘Training is the
first thing to go.’” Mary M. Galvin, Warning: Training
Cuts Can Be Hazardous to Your Financial Health, 42
PROSECUTOR 32, 32 (Oct./Nov./Dec. 2008). It would be
ironic if a jury’s factual finding that Petitioner’s
inadequate training caused Thompson’s horrific ordeal
led not to compensation for Thompson, but to license
to scale back the very training most prosecutors now
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agree can help prevent such tragedies in the first
place.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm
the judgment below.
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